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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on public takeovers and aim to disclose the revealing effects 
on a bid contest caused by a bidder’s initial ownership in the target company, the 
so-called toehold. We analyse the toehold’s impact on contest characteristics and 
focus on its ability to determine (i) the bid premium required to acquire the target 
and (ii) the expected probability of a successful outcome in the bid contest.  
We apply financial theory to outline bidding behaviour as well as observable 
dynamics in a takeover contest with toehold bidders. We include a discussion on 
the competitive climate in a takeover contest in relation to the different toehold 
strategies available. Theories have historically been inconclusive on the direct 
effects of a toehold in a takeover contest. We argue that findings evident in 
research on the US markets could not singlehandedly explain the results for any 
given country and shareholder structure. Takeover contests are complex processes 
and the regulatory framework and shareholder structure in which the target 
operates could have a major influence on the result. By using quantitative 
methods, we therefore challenge current theoretical relationships on a sample of 
202 takeovers attempts of publicly listed firms in Sweden in the period 1997-
2012, a market known for a focused shareholder structure and strict disclosure of 
holdings.  
The results shown in the thesis indicate a clear relationship and invigorate for 
new considerations on the subject. We provide firm evidence that toehold bidders 
have systematically acquired firms at a lower premium in relation to non-toehold 
bidders. In addition, even though the target is bought at a lower premium, toehold 
bidders have shown indications to have a higher probability to succeed in their 
takeover attempts. This perplex finding is discussed and it seems that deterring 
effects on rival bidders entrance is of high importance. Furthermore, the finding 
encourages an assessment of the historically evolved Swedish conditions for 
ownership in relation to the proposed inefficiency in the market for corporate 
control. 
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2 Introduction 
In this thesis, we focus on public takeovers and a bidder’s initial ownership in the 
target company at the time of a bid’s announcement, the so-called toehold. The 
focus is to reveal toeholds impact on the bid premium and the expected 
probability to win the bid contest. The topic has previously been addressed among 
researchers with inconclusive predictions on the theoretical effects of the bid 
contest. In addition, it appears that shareholder structure and regulations in 
relation to public takeovers across countries has not been accounted for. This 
study, performed on the Swedish market for public takeovers, could hence 
provide improved knowledge for academics, practitioners and regulators of the 
relationships in a country with strict takeover regulations and a focused ownership 
structure.  
Two variables of specific importance will be addressed in the following 
chapters, the bid premium and the probability of a successful outcome for the 
initial bidder. In more detail, the bidder in a takeover is most often required to 
offer the tendering shareholders a price higher than the current unaffected share 
price for a takeover to succeed, a bid premium. This bid premium needs to 
compensate the current shareholders for not being able to take part in any future 
value enhancement (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter & Davison, 2009).  
Prior research has attempted to determine the effects of toeholds on the bid 
premium in takeover attempts. Several articles have been performed on takeover 
contests on US data samples with contradicting theories about a toehold’s impact 
on the bid premiums. Among those who argue for a positive relationship are 
Chowdry & Jegadeesh (1994) while Betton & Eckbo (2000) together with 
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986) claim the opposite 
relationship. One common explanation of the lower premium found in Betton, 
Eckbo & Thorburn (2009) is the deterring effect on rival bidders entry caused by a 
toehold of the initial bidder. Their findings support that a toehold increases one’s 
probability to win the contest, lower the threat of a rival bidder and in those cases 
a rival bidder enters the contest, it enters with an equally large toehold.   
The toehold acquisition could hence come with some benefits to the bidder. If 
the purchase was part of a short-term strategy before announcing a bid on the 
target company, it would be preferred to purchase the toehold to an unaffected 
share price. However, it is common that other investors anticipate an upcoming 
bid when the acquirer has started his stake building. When investors begin to take 
positions in the stock to gain from a potential value increase, they put an upward 
pressure on the share price and create a run-up effect. This effect is one of the 
risks and costs of acquiring a toehold.  
So, why would Sweden be an appropriate object to study for these 
relationships? In relation to prior studies made on the US market, the Swedish 
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market is justified to test empirically from a number of reasons. First, stricter 
regulations on disclosure of company holdings in Sweden could increase the 
markets perceived probability of an upcoming bid. This would lead to higher costs 
of acquiring the toehold in the form of higher run-up costs and information 
disclosure (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; King and Padalko, 2005; Schwert, 1996). 
Second, the shareholder structure in Sweden is historically made up of large 
controlling owners allowed to utilize controlling power through a system of dual-
voting rights and pyramidal ownership. The ownership structure that this has 
facilitated is in stark contrast to the more dispersed structure evident 
internationally as in the example of US.  
Given these two structural deviations, we attempt to challenge the current 
empirical discoveries obtained from research on the US market and test them on 
the Swedish market. This study therefore aims to clarify the strategic impact of 
toeholds on bid premiums and the probability of success in a Swedish public 
takeover setting. We intend to provide vital knowledge to structural perceptions 
an acquirer must assess before initiating a public takeover contest in Sweden. A 
number of relevant questions will hence be examined in this thesis: What would 
an acquirer have to pay in a Swedish public takeover in terms of bid premium? 
What impact does a toehold have on the premium? Would an initial holding affect 
the probability of success in the bid contest? In what way does a toehold affect the 
competitive environment in a bid contest? Is the toehold decision affected by an 
anticipated dismissal of the offer from the target’s board of directors? 
2.1 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the essential terminology to enhance the 
understanding of the study in relation to takeovers, hostility and toeholds.  
Chapter 4 presents the regulatory framework for a public takeover in a 
Swedish setting. Regulatory- and shareholder structures are covered as a frame of 
reference, later compared to international structures in UK and US. 
Chapter 5 develops a theoretical foundation and discusses prior 
inconclusiveness of toehold relationships as well as potential benefits and 
limitations of toeholds in a public takeover 
Chapter 6 outlines the tendencies among prior research and presents the two 
hypotheses for this study 
Chapter 7 constitutes the methodological chapter, outlining the quantitative 
methods used in the study as well as data collection, sampling and adequate 
adjustments of information 
Chapter 8 consists of data description, analysis of patterns within the dataset 
and observations of possible relationships among bid contest characteristics 
Chapter 9 conclude and discuss the findings of this thesis, the two hypotheses 
are analysed and suggestion for future research is provided 
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3 Terminology 
This chapter will introduce the reader to the necessary terminology required to 
fully understand this thesis. The below terms will play a central part and will be 
explained in general terms in this chapter. The reader can then expect to 
continuously enhance the understanding of the terms while reading this thesis, as 
they will be used extensively. 
3.1 Takeovers 
 
The main objective for this thesis is focused on corporate acquisitions. The 
structure of a corporate acquisition process is dependent on whether the target in 
question is privately held or publicly listed. The typical way of purchasing a 
privately owned company is through negotiations with the target company’s 
owners or the board of directors (Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008c). During the 
process a mutual agreement can be reached between the involved parties and there 
are no requirements on announcing the bid publicly. The structure of a takeover 
process differs slightly when the target is a publicly listed firm. Discussions and 
negotiations can still have been held with the target’s owners or management 
before a purchase attempt is made. However, the bidder is required to publicly 
announce a legally binding takeover offer when he approaches the target 
shareholder with a request to acquire the outstanding shares in the company. A 
takeover offer is hence the term used when a bidder company makes an offer to 
acquire the voting shares of an exchange listed target company. (Betton et al., 
2008c) 
Therefore, the term takeover in this thesis is used to describe a corporate 
acquisition of a firm that is publicly listed on a stock exchange. A takeover 
attempt is the term used when a bidder firm announces a public takeover offer 
directed to the target shareholders with a request to purchase all outstanding 
shares. 
3.2 Hostile and friendly takeovers 
A public takeover could be divided into two sub-types, as being considered 
friendly or hostile. Central to the definition is the target's board of director’s 
action in relation to an incoming bid. As will be elaborated on in chapter 4, the 
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board of directors need to evaluate the announced takeover bid and present a 
recommendation to their shareholder regarding whether to reject or accept the bid 
(NasdaqOMX 2012). 
The definition of what is considered a hostile bid varies widely between 
different authors. A central reason behind this is that the central stakeholders, like 
the target management, the board of directors and the shareholders, often have 
different views on the assessment of a bid. For example, in his (2000) paper, 
Schwert uses five mutually not exclusive definitions to determine hostility in a 
takeover attempts and includes disclosed intent of an non-negotiated bid as well as 
potential rumours in the market about an unsolicited bid coming up to more 
objective definitions. Others, like Auerbach (1988) agree on a broader view and 
define hostility through a combination of using different definitions.  
In our thesis, we will use a less subjective definition that is commonly used in 
academic articles. We will classify a bid as hostile when the board of directors of 
the target company does not recommend its shareholders to accept the initial bid 
(Betton et al., 2009; Schoenberg & Thornton, 2006; Schwert, 2000). In other 
words, to classify the bid as hostile a physical action from the board of directors is 
required. Accordingly, a bid is considered as friendly if not explicitly expressed 
otherwise by the target board of directors. 
3.3 Toehold 
 
A central factor in this thesis is the bidder’s ownership of votes in the target 
company. Before the bidder initiate the takeover process, he is legally allowed to 
stakebuild the ownership. By acquiring shares on the open market before the 
takeover offer is announced, this reduces the amount of shares that are required to 
be purchased at a premium. Differently put, shares can be purchased ex-ante the 
bid in order to have a target ownership when the bidder approaches other 
shareholders for the remaining shares. This ownership position in a takeover 
process is called a toehold (Betton & Eckbo, 2000; Ravid & Spiegel, 1999). 
A toehold position can either be categorised as long term or short term 
dependent on when the position was acquired. If the target shares were held prior 
to six months before the bid was announced, it is considered to be a long-term 
toehold. This is usually the case for large controlling shareholders that have had 
ownership in the firm over several years. If the shares instead have been acquired 
during the six months leading up to the bid, the toehold position is defined as 
short term (Betton et al., 2009). 
The different motives and implications of acquiring a toehold, as well as a 
more thorough presentation of the theory on the subject, will be further presented 
in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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4 Regulatory framework 
This chapter elaborates on the evolution of the Swedish shareholder structure and 
relates the evolving structure to international comparable, mainly UK and US. 
With understanding of the social development, one could more easily interpret 
conditions in the Swedish market for corporate control. The role of the market for 
corporate control is hence interpreted as to transfer resources to the person who 
values them the most, stated differently as to facilitate a change in control (Skog, 
1997). To this, the British influenced model for Swedish takeover regulations is 
presented and two specific areas of importance are highlighted; the mandatory bid 
principle and the disclosure thresholds.  
4.1 Evolution of the Swedish ownership model 
The early 1900s in Sweden was a period of focused industrial ownership, where 
two men played an important role in the scope of this chapter; Marcus Wallenberg 
Sr. (1864-1943) and Ivar Kreuger (1880-1932). As a large shareholder, Marcus 
Wallenberg Sr. sought to control the management activities in a number of his 
listed companies without actively managing the company himself. By segregating 
the board from the management, the result was to form the Swedish model of 
three independent organs; Shareholders, Board of Directors and Management. The 
result was a clear separation of responsibilities between the shareholders, the 
board of directors and the executive management. Ivar Kreuger on the other hand, 
with his international conglomerate Swedish Match, introduced shares with 
different voting rights. His motivation was to warrant control to Swedish investors 
when he looked to London for raising capital to his listed companies. The dual 
class shares enable shareholders of the stronger voting power class more control 
of the company in relation to its capital invested compared to shareholders of the 
weaker class. These two conditions would come to influence the scene for any 
company active in mergers and acquisition in Sweden and could be argued to 
have led to (i) a significant blockholder structure and (ii) the frequent use of 
shares with multiple voting rights in Swedish listed companies (Nachemson-
Ekwall, 2012).  
The evolution could not be explained singlehandedly by formal events; also 
informal and socio-political factors have played an important role in the 
emergence of controlling shareholders. To name some, first the banks and their 
fully owned investment companies has historically had a close relationship to the 
firms’ management compared to other shareholders since they emerged as 
controlling owners of many industries in the financial crisis in 1920s 
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(Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). Second, there has been a political support for 
blockholdings facilitated by the dual voting rights and pyramidal ownership. 
Angblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt & Svancar (2002) supports this result and claim that 
there are two structural drivers that are allowed to be used in combination in 
Sweden, the pyramidal ownership of closed end funds such as Investor and 
Industrivärlden in combination with different voting rights. In the early 1990s, 
these two groups controlled more than 50% of the market capitalisation on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, but only two 2% of the dividend rights (Henrekson & 
Jacobsson, 2012). Högfeldt (2004) describes the situation in a way that the 
existing structure has politically been traded off by an indirect (direct) promise 
from the largest firms to invest in Sweden and not migrate. The essence and 
purpose of dual-voting rights could hence be seen as a tool in line with the Social 
Democratic model of corporate ownership and thus Swedish interests where 
promoted by the structure.  
Moreover, the Swedish tax system has facilitated the emergence of 
blockholders. A progressive personal income tax and the taxation of dividends 
both at a corporate level and trough personal taxation on capital gains has drained 
private owners historically in favour of corporate owners such as the investment 
companies (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). It is noticeable that the emergence of the 
blockholder structure is argued to have facilitated sell-outs in Sweden. A change 
of control in this blockholder structure is difficult without the consent of the 
controlling party. If a controlling owner decides to sell his block through a block 
transfer or as a part of a takeover, the offer is more likely to succeed (Angblad et 
al., 2001). 
If then discussing the use of dual class voting rights in specific, the effects in 
control concentration are high when comparing Sweden to other countries. A 
study made by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (1999) calculate the Vote 
to Capital (V/C) ratio for 20 largest firms in 27 countries and conclude that 
Sweden has the highest ratio of all with a V/C-ratio of 1.58. Angblad et al. (2002) 
strongly argues that the main driver or the high V/C-ratio for Sweden is a result of 
the widely used multiple voting right shares. In the mid 90s, over 85% of all 
Swedish listed firms used the dual shares approach. In 2010, this had decreased 
but still amounted to 50% (Henrekson & Jacobsson, 2012). What is important is 
how this could affect the takeover setting later analysed in this paper. The 
presence of different voting rights can ease the negotiation with target 
shareholders of large blocks and simultaneously reduce the attractiveness of the 
remaining shares. In addition, dual-voting rights could reduce the free-rider 
problem of widely held firms and hence promote takeover activity in case of a 
single bidder (Burkart & Lee, 2008). 
4.2 Swedish takeover regulations 
To begin, the rules for takeovers generally emanate from on the one hand the 
takeover regulations, originated from civil law regulations for listed companies, 
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and on the other hand capital market regulations on liquidity and trading rights for 
financial instruments (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). We will look at how the British 
Takeover Code has inspired Swedish regulations and reflect on two dimensions 
affecting our later research; the mandatory bid principle (MBR) and the 
disclosure thresholds.  
4.2.1 The British influences 
Regulations of Swedish takeovers are often referred to as a combination of British 
common law and Swedish civil law (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). The most 
influential regulation on which Sweden has resembled upon is the British City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which was first released in the 1950s. One of 
the fundamentals was that shareholders were given enough information about an 
offer to make an intelligent decision and enough time to digest it. From that point, 
shareholder primacy and board neutrality was established. Shareholder primacy 
claims that shareholders interests would be assigned first priority while board 
neutrality state that no actions would be taken by the board to frustrate a bid 
unless it had been previously authorized at target’s general meeting (Nachemson-
Ekwall, 2012). 
The UK system was formed using a combination of legislation and self-
regulation. The self-regulatory body of the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers was 
established in 1968 with the purpose to issue and administer the Code and to 
supervise and regulate takeovers. Sweden chose to adapt the same model. 
Consequently, in the very same year the self-regulatory body of the Commerce 
Stock Exchange Committee (Sw: “Näringslivets Börskommitté”, NBK) was 
founded with a purpose to promote good practises on the Swedish stock market. 
Their first recommendations came in 1971 and were formed based on the UK 
Takeover Code. Two guiding principles were made central; (i) Enable 
shareholders properly evaluate a bid and (ii) secure equal treatment of 
shareholders of same shareholder class. Since 1986 up until today, there is a 
second more independent body in Sweden, The Swedish Securities Council  (Sw : 
”Aktiemarknadsnämnden”). This body administer the rules issued by NBK and 
deal with individual cases of compliance against regulations. The separation 
between the two bodies was somewhat misleading; as the suggestion of directors 
were done by the same organizations and that there has been a personnel union 
between the two (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). 
The two models share many similarities. One difference though that could be 
stressed between the NBK and the Takeover panel was in the individuals who 
were able to get a seat into the committees. While NBK included only 
representatives from the private sector, both politicians and members of the 
industry were included in the British Takeover panel. It was also said that NBK 
had more power than its comparison. With the mandate to dictate the rules and 
pricing mechanisms of takeovers, these two factors could have influenced the 
direction in favour of the large blockholders in Sweden (Nachemson-Ekwall, 
2012). 
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4.2.2 The mandatory bid principle 
Only two years after the creation of the UK Takeover Panels in 1968, the 
Mandatory Bid Principle (MBR) was introduced and has almost been left 
unchanged since. The principle states that in the event of an emerging controlling 
shareholder of more than 30% of the shares, a bid has to be made on all remaining 
shares in the company. Minority shareholders would then get the right to sell their 
shares to the same price as had been paid previously. In effect, the policy made it 
more costly to acquire the company and supported management of the target 
company who was confronted with a takeover attempt (Nachemson-Ekwall, 
2012).  
In Sweden, NBK, chose not to implement MBR at the time. Their rationale 
was that it was regarded as in conflict with the blockholder governance structure 
on the Swedish stock market. It was argued that the MBR would hinder the 
restructuring of the corporate sector, as it would be harder to sell large block of 
shares at a premium. The policy was left out until 1999 when MBR was 
introduced, though still with some opposition. In contrast to the threshold of 30% 
set in most European countries at the time, NBK set the controlling threshold at 
40%. In addition, a shareholder already in control of 40% of the stocks or votes at 
the time of the introduction would be excluded (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). The 
position of large blockholder was hence not challenged and the introduction of the 
MBR would not enforce them to dispose, neither acquires new fractions to their 
large  position. Nachemson-Ekwall (2012) further address that the introduction 
was seen as positive from a minority shareholder’s perspective. The institutional 
investors, often in control of B-shares, thought they would increase in value.  This 
addressed the issue of low valuations of low voting right shares. A common 
practise of 10% price difference between A and B shares was decided if noting 
else was agreed.   
In 2003, MBR was amended to a 30% threshold to align Sweden with most 
other European countries. Shareholders with a controlling stake of 40% as of 1 
July 1999 were still to be excluded. Another significant difference was that three 
representatives from institutional investors were to be included in the NBK board, 
prior only consisting of representatives from the industrial sector alone. This was 
a clear move away from the ability for the large blockholders to dictate the 
structure and price of a takeovers to instead strengthen the role of minority 
shareholders, often institutional investors (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). To our 
interpretation, the dealing with the MBR is a clear example on the ability for large 
shareholders to dictate the rules for the Swedish takeover market.  By first 
avoiding the introduction and then permitting large shareholders exception from 
the newly introduced regulations, large shareholders interests has been assigned 
first priority, sometimes on the expense of small shareholders realisation of gains 
by allowing for more dynamics in the change of control.  
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4.2.3 Disclosure rules 
The disclosure rules state that a shareholder is obliged to inform the market if his 
holding in a company meets or passes any of the pre-defined thresholds 
independent of the direction of the change. In Sweden, the thresholds are 5, 10, 
15, 20, 25, 30, 50, 66 2/3 and 90% of the votes or number of shares in the 
company (SFS 1991:980).  
In UK, a company that hold or cease to hold 3% of the target shares has to 
inform the market of this. In addition, each 1% above this 3% that is reached, 
passed or fallen below has to be reported (Herbert Smith LLP, Gleiss Lutz and 
Stibbe, 2010). In contrast to Sweden and UK, the US rules require a shareholder 
to disclose a change of ownership if the purchases mean he penetrates the 5% 
level of control in the firm (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). US 
firms have to register its intention with the holding, no such equivalent is found 
either in UK or Sweden (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012).  
Differences in disclosure rules could have an impact on the takeover setting 
and thus the market for corporate control. Siems & Schouten (2009) states that 
higher disclosure help bidders to estimate the likelihood that their offer will 
succeed and identify parties who could be approached for different strategic 
reasons. In addition, the transparency enables other potential bidders to 
materialize an offer if they are alerted of a third parties stakebuilding in the target.  
On the other hand, a high level of ownership disclosure could negatively affect 
the market for corporate control by several potential reasons. First, higher 
disclosure could deter a bidder from a takeover attempt in the first place, as they 
fear that possible competition would reduce its potential profits. Second, 
disclosure of this type could alert management to take on defensive actions to 
fence of any potential bidders and thus limit an effective market for corporate 
control (Siems & Schouten, 2009). Third, an initial bidder incurs search cost when 
attempting to identify a potential target. These search costs are part of the total 
profit that the bidder will generate from a potential purchase, and will therefore 
affect the offer price he is able to pay. When a target is found and the bidder 
discloses his toehold purchase, the potential target is revealed to all other potential 
Table 1 
Table describes some of the revision made to Swedish takeover regulations 
Source: Nachemson-Ekwall (2012) 
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rival bidders. These bidders can free-ride on the search costs incurred by the 
initial bidder and benefit from the target screening, allowing them to pay a higher 
price than what would be possible for the first bidder (Bainbridge, 2008).  This 
potential to free-ride on other bidders can be counterproductive for the takeover 
activity. 
The most important element is though how these regulations impact the 
possible actions for an investor. The US regulation allows for some levels of 
investor exploitation of the rules, while the Swedish regulations are stricter. The 
Swedish Finansinspektionen requires the investor who penetrates a disclosure 
level to act fast. The investor needs to notify Finansinspektionen at latest the day 
after the purchase has been made. Moreover, Finansinspektionen will announce 
the change of ownership information to the market before noon the day after the 
message was received (SFS 1991:980). The regulation that is in place in US 
allows the investor more discretion. After a purchase is made that breaches the 5% 
level the investor is allowed 10 days before they are required to file the 13d form 
to disclose their holdings. During this period the investor is allowed to continue 
purchasing shares in the market, which can be done without notifying the market 
before ten days have passed since the initial penetration. This rule allows the 
investor to accumulate a shareholding and stakebuild his ownership during the 10-
day window (Asquith & Kiescnick, 1999).  A common takeover tactic is to 
purchase 4.9% in the market and keep the ownership at that level until everything 
for the takeover is prepared. Once the bidder is fully prepared to launch the bid, 
he will purchase shares in the market to penetrate the 5% level, trigger the 10-day 
window and buy aggressively once triggered. Once the 10-day window closes, the 
disclosure form will be announced to the market together with the takeover offer 
(Bainbridge, 2008). This enables investors looking at US targets to stakebuild 
large ownerships unnoticed and use a guerrilla tactic, while an investor on the 
Swedish market is unable to make such purchases below the radar and utilize such 
tactic. 
4.3 An international perspective  
Up until now we have been introduced to the evolution of the Swedish ownership 
model and some regulatory differences among countries related to a takeover. 
Ultimately when later analysing the empirical findings related to the Swedish 
market for corporate control, we could build on this knowledge to bring depth and 
possible explanations to our results. A general perspective can now be made of 
Sweden in an international public takeovers setting.  
To begin, the strong focus of family ownership in Sweden is very high 
compared to both UK and US. While the control of the 20 largest firms in the mid 
90s was widely held in both UK and US, family’s and state controlled a 
significant share of the largest Swedish firms (La Porta et al., 1999). Angblad et 
al. (2002) maps 304 Swedish listed firms by type of controlling owner according 
to the identity of the investor holding the largest fraction of votes. The study is 
  12 
performed in the early stage of our analysed period, yet the results are significant. 
For the full sample, 61.8% of the firms have a family/private owner, such as the 
Wallenberg’s, as the single largest owner. If we narrow the sample to the 20 
largest firms by market cap, the figure amounts to 50%. The second and third 
largest owners for the full sample are other interest spheres (10.2%), such as 
Industrivärlden, and foreign owners (8.6%).  
Moreover, to us the difference in ownership structure is also interrelated to the 
view of corporate control and regulations among Sweden, US and UK. Several 
sources for change has effected the direction of rules historically, and 
simultaneously encouraged different shareholder structures. First, country specific 
events such as the Great Depression and Enron Crash in the US or the Kreuger 
Crash in Sweden has driven reactions in the regulations, for example the Swedish 
separation of investment companies and banks by law. Second, the growth of 
institutional investors began earlier in UK than in US leading to the involving of 
market actors in forming the regulations in UK in contrast to the legal track in US. 
The choice of self-regulation and legislation distributes power among different 
actors on the market. Board neutrality rule, makes the large influential 
shareholders rather than management the ultimate decision makers during a bid 
process. In US, takeover regulations has granted the target’s management with 
more bargaining power to counteract a bid. The risk is therefore that a US bidder 
end up paying a higher price than in a UK takeover. Only UK regulations have an 
expressed disfavouring of controlling shareholders in certain situations. As an 
example, shareholders in control of over 10% of the votes are not able to vote at 
the general meeting in a parent-subsidiary merger. The acquirer would not be able 
to merge the target into its own without the consent of a super-majority of the 
other minority shareholders, which could imply a lower interest in controlling a 
British publicly listed company. No such discrimination is found neither in US 
nor Swedish regulations. It could be noted though that ordinary shareholders 
inability to nominate candidates to the board of directors in US also makes it less 
attractive to become a large shareholder compared to Sweden (Nachemson-
Ekwall, 2012). 
To conclude, in order to understand the observations in the existence and size 
of toeholds in each country we have to study the corresponding view on corporate 
governance and takeover regulation. While UK has some regulations that 
disfavour blockholding, US have no such expressed preference. It could be noted 
though that the strong minority protection and power put in the hands of 
management in US could explain a more dispersed ownership structure in line 
with UK. It is more evident however that Sweden systematically has been in 
favour to facilitate blockholdings in stark contrast to the other two mentioned. 
With this knowledge in mind, it puts us in a position to analyse what previous 
research can say about the relationship between toeholds and bid premiums in a 
potential takeover.  
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5 Theoretical framework 
The available literature on toeholds and bid premiums is indecisive of whether a 
toehold would imply a higher or lower premium in a takeover situation. For 
example, Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), Harrington & Prokop (1993) and Burkart 
(1995) claims that owning a toehold leads to a higher ability to pay high 
premiums, or overbid, partly since the toehold gives the bidder a lower average 
price for the shares acquired in the takeover.  This is inconsistent with Betton et 
al. (2009) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986) who argue that toeholds are associated 
with lower offer premiums in winning bids due to deterring effect on competition 
and reduced issues with free-riding shareholders. In addition, Betton & Eckbo 
(2000) claim that toeholds increase the probability of a successful takeover, 
consistent with Grossman & Hart (1980), Walkling (1985) Hirshleifer & Titman 
(1990), and Eckbo & Langohr (1989). To conclude, this chapter will examine 
different aspects of toeholds and present the inconclusiveness of its effects among 
researchers in the field. After we have presented some of the, of us defined, 
benefits of toeholds they will be contrasted with some of the perceived 
limitations. 
5.1  Bidder benefits of toeholds in takeovers 
The following section will discuss historical theories as well as the current state of 
knowledge in relation to toeholds effect on bid premiums and probability of 
success in takeovers. In order to provide a structure to this chapter, these will be 
discussed in terms of benefits and limitations for the toehold bidder. A benefit is 
by us seen as an ability to behave in a certain manner conditional on possessing a 
toehold. We therefore see the size of the bid premium as a result of these 
additional alternatives of action and do not assess a high or low premium as good 
or bad. Such a label only assesses an isolated variable and does not account for 
long-term effects in terms of profitability among others. In similar, the later 
discussed limitations are aspects that affect the characteristics of a takeover 
contest where the initial bidder possess or attempt to stakebuild share prior to the 
offer announcement.  
5.1.1 Reduced complication of free-riding shareholders 
To begin with the benefits, Grossman & Hart conducted one of the first and most 
cited papers in the field in 1980 on acquisitions with toeholds. They considered a 
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takeover model where the target was owned by small atomistic shareholders who 
all faced the decision to accept the takeover bid or retain their shares. Each 
shareholders individual decision would not impact the probability for the offer to 
succeed; the offer would still be able to go through. Selling shareholders that 
settled for the bid premium hence expose themselves to a risk that this might be 
lower than the post-takeover value of their shares. For each shareholder, it 
therefore seemed rational to “free-ride” on her fellow shareholders to tender. The 
consequences of this framework are noticeable. First, the acquirer has to offer the 
full added value per share for the offer to succeed, often referred to as the free-
rider condition for a successful offer. Second, the bidder has no incentive to incur 
the search and bid costs, as they will not be covered by a successful bid. If the 
free-rider condition would hold no takeovers would be made  (Grossman & Hart, 
1980). 
Therefore, bidding with a toehold would solve this problem proposed by 
Grossman & Hart (1980). From the already owned shares, a bidder would now 
take part in the post-acquisition value from the already owned shares. The gain on 
this strategy had to be large enough to cover the search and bid expenses. The 
observation would hence increase the probability of successful offer by allowing a 
bidder to gain on the toehold while making zero profit of the share in the formal 
takeover offer (Eckbo, 2009; Grossman & Hart, 1980). 
The above model does not account for blockholders in the target company. 
This was to be addressed in the free-riding model presented by Shleifer & Vishny 
(1986), also discussed in Eckbo (2009). The ownership structure now differed 
from the Grossman & Hart (1980) framework, as did the behaviour of the target 
shareholders. A large blockholder in the target company now affected the decision 
rule for each small shareholder. The author argued that a blockholder’s decision to 
sell or retain affects the probability that the offer will succeed, anticipated by the 
small shareholders. In Eckbo (2009), small shareholders took the blockholder’s 
expected actions into account and viewed a completion of the offer as more likely. 
As a result, they would be willing to tender at a lower price than the full value 
added as in Grossman & Hart (1980). By taking this view and adapt it to a 
Swedish setting with a focused ownership, a blockholder that initiates a bid would 
be able to pay a lower premium and reach a higher probability of success in the 
offer.  
5.1.2 Toeholds enable overbidding 
The models of Grossman & Hart (1980) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986) do not 
include the aspect that some transactions fail. To include this aspect, Hirshleifer & 
Titman (1990) created a model to determine the relationship between initial 
holdings and probability of winning based on rational bidders who bid according 
to their individual value improvements of the takeover. The costs of a failed bid 
was related to the alternative cost to the bidder, a bidder with a higher initial 
holding hence faced a higher incentive to bid high relative a low-valuation bidder. 
Since the higher premium level and probability of success was related according 
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to the author; the low initial holding bidder would have a lower probability to win 
the auction. Accordingly, the probability to win was therefore higher for the 
toehold bidder. The predictions of higher success were therefore consistent with 
prior research by Walkling (1985) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986). Similar findings 
were also evident in Bris (2002) where additional variables for stock liquidity and 
information disclosure were considered.  
5.1.3 Aggressive toehold bidding – a win win situation? 
If bidding high enabled through initial ownership, does it then promote an 
aggressive bidding behaviour? Loyola (2012) presents an intuitive argumentation 
on two reasons to why a toehold bidder could bid more aggressively. First, a 
toehold bidder can profit both from winning the auction and by losing to a rival 
bidder. Conditional on losing, it transforms the toehold bidder into a seller who 
sells their toehold to the winning bidder and hence gains on a more aggressive 
bidding behaviour. Every bid therefore also represent an ask on its own holdings, 
consistent with argument in Carroll & Griffith (2010). Second, conditional on 
winning, the toehold bidder has a lower costs of overbidding since a lower 
number of shares have to be acquired relative a non-toehold bidder consistent with 
Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), Bulow, Huang & Klemperer (1999), Dasgupta & 
Tsui (2000), Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Betton et al. (2009) and Loyola (2012). 
The argument that a toehold bidder is able to bid in excess of his valuation is 
also indicated in Burkart (1995). In the context, the author argued that it was 
always optimal to bid over ones valuation of the target and that a bidder should 
strive for a maximum toehold. With this view, the bid could sometimes lead to a 
net-loss in the transaction with much of the profits accrued to selling shareholders. 
However, this was rational based on a strict profit maximising approach compared 
to management hubris and other working streams in the subject. Burkart pointed 
to the additional aspects of the overvalued bid; namely its ability to pre-empt 
competition from rival bidders. He argued that the level of the initial bid could 
deter competition. In addition, the bid level necessary to prevent rival bidders to 
enter the contest decreased with the size of the toehold. A maximum toehold was 
therefore always optimal; a discussion that will be further examined in the 
following section.  
5.1.4 Deterring effect on rival bidders 
As implied, the existence of toeholds could deter competition in a bid contest. 
Burkart (1995) states that researchers have found it hard to find direct evidence 
for this proposition. However, tentative support has been found in Stultz et al. 
(1990) who report much larger toeholds in uncontested competitions than in 
contested, a proxy for the deterring effects of toeholds. In similar, Betton & Eckbo 
(2000) found that when rival bidders entered a takeover contest with a positive 
toehold, the toehold size was on average of roughly the same size as of the initial 
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bidder. It therefore seems that rival bidders are aware of the toehold advantage 
and wants to even out the playing field before entering the contest. This is also 
supported by the argument that acquiring a toehold is a common and profitable 
strategy as it could help the bidder win the auction, and win cheaply. (Betton & 
Eckbo, 1997; Bulow et al., 1999; Jennings & Mazeo, 1993; Stultz, Walkling & 
Long, 1984). 
As presented previously, competitions can be divided into the subtypes 
friendly and hostile. Dewatripont (1993) provides a model in a hostile takeover 
setting by analysing the ‘leading shareholder’ strategy as a way to acquire the 
company for a hostile bidder. The strategy amounts to an acquisition of shares in 
the open market prior to the takeover, sometimes up to 20-30% but less than a 
majority. By doing so, the hostile acquirer can deter competition of rival bidder 
and white knights. In this sense, the bidder can reduce the dependence on the 
relative management skills between bidders and the bid premium’s level in 
relation to other incoming bids. Compared to prior models brought forward in this 
study, Dewatripont confirms the deterring benefits to the bidder in a contest that 
also accounts for parameters such as liquidity constraints and defensive actions of 
target management.  
When dealt with different subtypes in a completion, one can also account for 
different type of bidders. Bulow et al. (1999) hence state that it is more to the 
story in auctions dependent on whether bidders are strategic, with a private-value 
of the target and auctions among financial actors with a common-value. “A 
financial bidder should not generally compete with a strategic without a toehold 
or other financial inducement” (Bulow et al., 1999, p.430). Moreover, these 
financial actors may differ in estimated required returns; still they are more 
similar in strategy. The deterring effects of toeholds are thus even more important 
in common value auctions. The author argues that the toehold decreases the 
bidder’s winners curse and allows the bidder to be more aggressive. 
Simultaneously, the non-toehold bidder increases the risk of winner’s curse and 
therefore bid more conservative. If all bidders have a toehold of equal size, they 
would be more aggressive resulting in a higher price than if none had a toehold. A 
competitive bidder would hence have to adapt its strategy to the toehold bidders 
aggressiveness. The conclusion is that the deterring effect is adaptive to both 
asymmetries in size and existence of toeholds. With this view, a toehold could 
fend off competing bids that would have raised the final premium. By looking at 
the deterring effects of a toehold, it also increases the chance to win consistent 
with prior arguments from Walkling (1985), Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer 
& Titman (1990) and Betton & Eckbo (1997).  
5.2 Limitations of toeholds in takeovers 
As presented above, there are a number of potential benefits of owning a toehold 
when initiating a takeover attempt. Intuitively we should expect to see a high 
frequency of toeholds in these processes. This is especially true considering a 
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large number of central papers, for example Grossman and Hart (1980) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), who state that the gains made on toehold owning’s 
are a major contributor to the total profits obtained in a takeover process.  
In contrast to what could be expected, many articles point towards a low 
toehold frequency among bid contests. In their article, Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) 
find that around 40% of the bidders in their dataset of US targets had no toeholds 
prior to their takeover attempt. Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) reached the 
conclusion by investigating their dataset of US companies that more than 50% of 
the bidder firms did not acquire a toehold position before executing their tender 
offer. Moreover, most US firms covered by Jennings and Mazeo (1993) did not 
acquire a toehold position either.  
In a more recent article by Betton et al. (2009), the authors finds a distinct 
trend by examining over 10,000 control bids on US public targets. The presence 
of toeholds in takeover processes has been steadily declining since the early 
1980s. During the time period 1973-2002 they find that toeholds were only visible 
in 13% of all control bids. Toeholds could differently put be considered a rarity in 
takeover attempts. Interestingly, when toehold positions actually do occur, they 
tend to be large with an average size of around 20%. The author finds that it 
seems to be a binary decision; their result indicates that one either initiate a 
process with a large toehold or without a toehold at all. 
Of interest, in the same article Betton et al. find that within hostile takeover 
attempts, the presence of toeholds seem to be the norm with toeholds in 50% of 
the occasions. Betton et al. explain this trend by linking the results to structural 
developments within the takeover field. The peak of toeholds in the mid 80s 
coincides with an increase in the usage of takeover defences among target 
companies. The authors state that toehold bidding is optimal when the bidder is 
prepared to make a hostile offer and challenge initial target rejection or active 
defence actions. The high frequency of toeholds within hostile takeover attempts 
would support this notion.  
Despite above empirical findings, consensus theory states that a bidder should 
accumulate the maximum amount of toehold ownership possible before initiating 
his takeover attempt. This is not what we see when reviewing empirical results. 
Along with the Betton and Eckbo results presented above, Jennings and Mazeo 
(1993) and Stultz et al. (1990) finds that when toeholds actually do exist in a 
takeover attempt, whether hostile or friendly, the bidders surprisingly hold well 
less than 5% of the target stock.  
This particular area of toehold ownership, called the toehold puzzle, is a 
commonly debated subject among academics. If the consensus is that you make 
best use of your chances and your profits in a takeover by maximizing your 
toehold position, why do we not see more toehold positions among takeover 
initiators? There must be conditions that steer bidders away from acquiring a large 
toehold position before initiating a takeover attempt. 
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5.2.1 Information disclosure and price run-ups 
One major complicating factor in the toehold puzzle is the existence of price run-
ups. Takeover attempts are in most instances preceded by upwards-directed target 
stock price movements. These movements are generally called price run-ups and 
are caused by the market actors’ anticipation an upcoming bid. The market values 
the target stock to reflect the expected probability of a takeover attempt as well as 
the potential synergies that will be realised if the bid succeeds (Bris, 2002). The 
view that large toehold positions could be acquired to an unaffected share price 
prior to the bid does therefore not seem to hold. As suggested by Schwert (1996) 
it is very costly to buy a large toehold position since increasing the size of one’s 
position will push up the pre-bid price. 
There is a number of ways to intentionally or unintentionally disclose 
information to the public regarding an upcoming bid. One common reason for 
price run-ups would be leakage to the market in the form of rumours. Meulbroek 
(1992) and Schwert (1996) finds higher run-ups in cases where SEC has been 
investigating insider trading, suggesting that illegal trading could be one of the 
price drivers before a tender offer. However, the illegal aspects of price run-ups 
are in minority. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) conclude in their paper that there are a 
number of legitimate information sources that allow investors to anticipate 
takeover attempts. King and Padalko (2005) agree in their paper where they relate 
most run-up movements to public disclosures. Both of these papers suggest that 
the main driver behind price run-ups is the regulatory framework in place. As 
been presented in Chapter 4 of this paper, different legislation requires certain 
ownership and intention disclosure when penetrating certain control thresholds. 
For example, in US an investor needs to complete a 13d filing to the SEC when 
reaching a 5% ownership threshold, while the Swedish regulation requires 
ownership disclosure every time a 5% level is penetrated. These disclosures 
provide the market with information about possible upcoming bids, and positions 
are taken by investors to speculate on a bid premium to be realised within shortly.  
There are more run-up related costs to acquiring a toehold than just the actual 
costs of the toehold transaction. The traditional view assumes that the final bid 
premium is independent of price run-ups before the offer is made (Betton et al. 
2008b). The only cost of acquiring the toehold would then be the run-up effect on 
the stock. However, as presented in Schwert (1996) and Betton et al. (2008b) 
there is a strong relationship between price run-ups and increases in initial offer 
premium. Betton et al. (2008b) finds that a $1 increase in stock price as a run-up-
movement results in a $0.8 increase in bid premium. Schwerts (1996) similar 
findings indicated a $0.67 increase in initial bid premium for the same stock 
movement. 
Conclusively, owning a toehold provides the bidder with a very strong 
position when initiating a takeover attempt. It is however difficult and expensive 
to acquire a toehold position. If the bidder does not own a long-term toehold 
previously, it is (i) costly to acquire a large short-term toehold through multiple 
acquisitions on the market due to the price run-up. Moreover, (ii) acquiring a short 
term toehold will according to above empirical results lead to overpaying for the 
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remaining shares through the inflated bid premium that follows the price run-up.  
Schwert (1996) suggests that many bidders chose to not acquire target shares 
before a tender offer, from fear of raising the total costs of a successful takeover. 
Consistent with this, Betton et al. (2009) finds that only 3% of bidders in their 
dataset acquire short-term toeholds before bidding. Schwert’s suggestion would 
provide explanatory power to the empirical results of zero or low toeholds in 
takeover situations.  
5.2.2 Market liquidity 
Ravid and Spiegel (1999) presents a model that according to theory explains an 
optimal toehold strategy in a takeover situation. They introduce the concept of 
market liquidity of the target stock. With high market liquidity, the authors state it 
becomes easier to acquire a toehold without impact on the stock price. Ravid and 
Spiegel argue that the optimal toehold hence becomes large when the liquidity is 
high. Accordingly, the reverse also holds. When the market for the target stock is 
characterized with low liquidity, the optimal toehold decreases towards zero, as 
the toehold acquisition would create a greater run-up impact on the target stock. 
Their suggestion gives an additional dimension given the academic consensus 
that a toehold always should be acquired before initiating a takeover process. 
Moreover, they see toeholds as a deterrence tool only, and their model states that a 
toehold should only be purchased if the initial bidder is expecting any rival 
bidders to enter the process. An interesting demonstration in their paper is the 
finding that a large toehold is by no means a more efficient tool to deter 
competition than a small toehold. The actual toehold position as a binary 
categorization is the distinguishing factor when deterring rival bidders, a finding 
that could provide explanatory power to the presence of small toeholds when 
toeholds occur.  
In his paper, Bris (2002) investigates why we do not see more open market 
purchases by bidders prior to announcing a tender offer. Through the expected 
increase in trading volume that follows short-term toehold building, Bris suggests 
that the bidder releases information to the market about a potential upcoming bid. 
The sizes of the trading orders allow shareholders to form an opinion about the 
quality of the potential bidder. Bris suggests that market liquidity might allow 
bidders to partially hide their trades in order to withhold this information from the 
market. He proposes that stock liquidity and toehold size are positively related. 
The articles suggests that the optimal toehold is, given stock liquidity, of a size 
that does not allow the market to determine if a bid is going to occur or not. Under 
low liquidity conditions, no toehold acquisition at all will therefore be the optimal 
strategy for a bidder before announcing a tender offer.  
Other central articles provide additional views to the market liquidity aspect of 
toehold purchases. For example, Schwert (1996) presents that unusual patterns of 
price movements and higher trading volumes are a common way for investors to 
spot potential upcoming bids.  In his paper, Qian (2001) presents his expectation 
that a bidder would purchase toeholds up to the size that the market liquidity 
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allows, i.e. maximizing the toehold position given market liquidity constraints. 
Others like Kyle and Vila (1991) provide the reader with an alternative solution 
for acquiring toehold positions. They suggest that it is possible to camouflage 
purchases in liquid market using noise traders. However, this notion fails to take 
into account local disclosure regulations that prohibit owners to acquire shares 
without disclosing their ownership when penetrating certain thresholds. Price run-
ups are agreed among academics to be a significant cost when acquiring a toehold 
position. 
5.2.3 Alternative explanations 
Besides the run-up costs associated with information disclosure through public 
announcements or market liquidity, the academic literature provides a number of 
alternative explanations to the low frequency of toeholds in takeover situations. 
Goldman and Qian (2005) agrees that a toehold increases the probability of 
success in the transaction and acknowledges the benefits of owning one. In their 
paper, they model the potential value of the target firm following a failed takeover 
attempt by the bidder. In line with academic consensus the authors agree that a 
larger toehold will increase the potential profits from a successful takeover 
attempt. However, inconsistent with important central publications like Hirshleifer 
and Titman (1990) or Chowdry and Jegadeesh (1994), Goldman and Qian argue 
that holding a toehold potentially could reduce the profits from their position 
given the takeover fails. 
Goldman and Qian look at the targets managers’ incentives to block a 
takeover attempt when modelling the failed takeover value of the company. They 
argue that target managers have larger incentive to block a takeover if they 
experiences private benefits of control. This is also true for the reverse situation. 
Managers have smaller incentives to block the trade if they hold equity ownership 
in the target and therefore would gain from the value-increasing takeover. Only if 
the gain of the value increase exceeds their experienced private benefit will they 
accept the takeover attempt, the managerial entrenchment. If a large toehold 
owner attempts to take over the firm and fails, the market perceives this as if a 
high level of entrenchment is present in the firm. High entrenchment reduces the 
market value and the toehold owner’s position will be worth less, ex post, the 
failed takeover attempt when the market re-evaluates the firm. Their model 
predicts that a bidders optimal toehold should be negatively related with the size 
of the target management’s equity ownership. Goldman and Qian hence puts 
forward a model that presents a cost of owning a toehold and an explanation on 
why you would enter a takeover contest without any prior, or a small, ownership 
stake in the target. 
Asquith and Kiescnick (1999) examines toehold positions among bidders on 
the US market prior to initiating a takeover attempt. In accordance with the price 
run-up theory, they state that all stock purchases before a tender offer would 
incorporate market expectations about the coming takeover premium. They find 
significant evidence that the target firm size have an impact on the relationship 
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between toehold and market premium. They find that the larger the target firms 
the smaller toeholds could be expected. The intuition behind this is that it is more 
difficult to obtain a large position in a large target due to higher market awareness 
of the firm and the higher frequency of risk arbitrage investors speculating in 
takeover bids. This leads to higher costs of acquiring a toehold and by that reason 
we see smaller toeholds in takeover attempts on larger targets.  
In his paper Qian (2001) looks into the puzzling question on why bidders 
initiate takeover attempt with zero or low toeholds, despite the clear advantages of 
such ownership in the target. He comes to the conclusion that a toehold is very 
profitable in case of a successful takeover attempt. However, in case of a failed 
attempt the toehold will be a source of loss for the bidder. The logic behind his 
conclusion is that in a successful takeover attempt, a toehold is a source of gains 
since target shares were purchased at the open market to a price on discount 
compared to the premium inflated takeover bid. In the model a target is 
considered to be undervalued because of agency problems between owner and 
managers, as presented by Jensen (1986). His assumption is that if the target 
management rejects the takeover bid, the market will readjust their valuation of 
the target based on a view that the target is stuck with inefficient entrenched 
management with private benefits of control. He models the two possible 
scenarios and finds that the trade-off between possible gains versus possible 
losses trades each other out. In other words, managers consumption smoothing 
behavioural pattern drives them to acquiring a zero toehold before initiating a 
takeover attempt.  
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6 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature presented in chapter 5, we expect toeholds to be a vital 
determinant of the dynamics in a takeover attempt. Our hypotheses will hence be 
aimed towards analysing its relation to the price of the acquisition and the 
probability of a successful outcome.  
 
Toeholds, bid premiums and takeover probability 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship in toehold size and bid premium  
 
It has previously been argued that a toehold position leads to a lower offer 
premium. Based on the theoretical suggestions by Shleifer & Vishny (1986), 
Eckbo & Langohr (1989), Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), Betton & Eckbo (2000) 
and Goldman & Qian (2005) we expect to see a negative relationship between the 
toehold size and bid premium. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the toehold, the higher the probability of a successful bid  
 
Furthermore, emphasize has been put into explaining the deterrence effects 
caused by toeholds and the bidding behaviour that is associated with toehold 
ownership. Based on the predictions of Walkling (1985), Shleifer & Vishny 
(1986), Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), Burkart (1995) as well as Betton & Eckbo 
(1997) we expect to see a higher probability to win for bidders with a toehold 
position. 
The next chapter will present the quantitative methods used to test our 
hypotheses together with a detailed explanation of how the data has been collected 
and processed in order to fit our analysis. 
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7 Method 
In this chapter, a presentation will be given on the methods used to perform this 
study. First, we will present the data collection process. We will then present the 
sampling of this data to finally discuss some of the adjustments that have been 
made in order to fit the purpose with respect to specific characteristics of the 
Swedish takeover market. The statistical techniques for analysing the dataset are 
influenced by the methods used in Betton & Eckbo (2000) of OLS estimations of 
initial bid premium as well as a logit regression model of contest outcome 
influenced by methods used in Walkling & Long (1984), Walkling (1985) and 
Jennings & Mazeo (1993). 
The quantitative methods used in this study rely on systematic empirical 
investigations of social phenomena using statistical or mathematical techniques. 
The relationship between theory and research is of a deductive approach. The 
view on reality is objectivistic and intends to create a portrait of relationships 
often hard to observe in its purest form. The tests performed in this study hence 
use quantitative methods to test economics and finance theories (Bryman & Bell, 
2003). In addition, a socioeconomic perspective is included in the regulatory 
framework on how takeover regulations have developed. This takes on a view of 
the takeover environment as being socially constructed. Human’s actions are 
socially constructed and organizations are complex systems with agents organised 
into groups with sometimes seemingly irrational decision models (Nachemson-
Ekwall, 2012). By adding a perspective of sociology and institutionalism, we 
intend to provide an explanation to how the ownership structure has emerged in 
Sweden.  
We are aware of the possible limitations with a quantitative study based on 
secondary sources, such as (a) not familiar with data, (b) complexity of data 
material, (c) lack of control over the quality of data and (d) the availability of all 
key data (Bryman & Bell, 2005). These will be discussed and incorporated 
continuously in the appropriate sections of this chapter. We will now begin by 
discussing the data collection process.  
7.1 Data collection 
The full dataset of public takeovers has been extracted from the databases of 
NasdaqOMX, Zephyr and S&P CapitalIQ. No single database has been able to 
provide details on all transactions singlehandedly. Furthermore, notifications of 
certain characteristics such as hostility have sometimes been incorrectly notified 
and/or measured. The databases have therefore been used in combination and 
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allowed us to create an extensive sample on this specific matter and geographic 
market. The restraint of complete and available data was undertaken by 
crosschecking all transactions with press releases available through Affärsdata 
and CisionWire in combination with official offer documents available at time of 
announcement. Reuters Eikon and Reuters Datastream have been used to extract 
target tickers and historical share prices used to calculate bid premiums. 
Researchers in this field have to be aware of some limitations in publicly 
available data. An acquisition of a public target is a complex process with a large 
amount of sensitive and undisclosed information. Discussions are also held among 
actors in the process without the awareness of the public. Only publicly available 
data can hence be collected and used in this study to not discriminate among bid 
contests with different media coverage and over time. No rumoured information is 
taken into consideration in the data collection. Given this condition, the 
discussions held among actors prior to filing an official bid could embrace effects 
in the competitive climate in the contest not visible to the public, nor in the result 
of this study. Any effects of toeholds on contest characteristics could therefore be 
deviating from what is possible to prove in this study.  
7.2 Data sampling 
When data has been extracted from the databases, a number of screening criteria 
have been used to serve the objective of the study. As mentioned, this thesis 
exclusively looks at public takeover bids, i.e. a bid directed towards the target 
shareholders to acquire 100% of the outstanding shares in a publicly listed 
company in Sweden. Transaction type has therefore been set to Public Takeover 
or Full Tender Offer and geographic location to Sweden. The time frame has been 
set to cover the 16-years period of transactions announced between 01/01/1997 
and 12/31/2012. The analysed period provide available data from NasdaqOMX of 
takeover contests on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Information prior to this 
faces a risk that correctness of data could be hard to validate. In 1999, a third 
revision of the takeover rules was implemented that included clearer prospectus 
requirements that has facilitated the data gathering process (Nachemson-Ekwall, 
2012). In addition, this period covers two merger waves, the fifth in 1993-2000 
and the sixth in 2004-2008 when Lehman Brothers crashed in September that 
year. These periods are influenced by high takeover activity and good access to 
funding of acquisitions. If narrowing the time frame of the analysed period, this 
cyclicality could possibly affect the outcome of premiums and takeover success 
(Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). 
By excluding rumoured bids, a total of 340 transactions have been identified. 
From these, a number of actions have been performed to identify the appropriate 
attributes. First, since this study identify control bids only, consistent with Betton 
et al. (2009), the data sample has been adjusted for transactions where the bidder 
already holds more than 50% of the votes in the company, hence already in 
control when the bid for remaining shares was announced. These transactions 
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have been removed and only bids where a bidder initiates a process with less than 
50% of the votes in search for a position of more than 50% is used. Second, the 
sample is reduced in order to fit the model standard used in Betton and Eckbo 
(2000) where multiple bids on the target from the initial or a rival bidder are 
grouped into one contest. A takeover contest is constructed based on the initial bid 
compared to how data is presented in the databases where individual bids are 
sometimes viewed as separate contests. Instead, a contest is the result of a 
takeover attempt with successive bids either through a rival bidder entering the 
contest or by a bid jump from the initial bidder. New bids from the initial or rival 
bidder that occurs within six months after the last bid are considered belonging to 
the same contest. All bids on the target placed after six months of a prior are 
considered as a beginning of a new public takeover contest. Third, we have 
removed contests when the objective of the observed takeover attempts clearly 
has been to merge two firms into one, creating a new combined entity. These 
situations put the surrendering shareholders into a position where post-transaction 
value increases are to a large extent attributable to them as well. The dynamics of 
these takeover attempts are somewhat different than for full tender offer, which 
makes them deceptive for our analysis and have been removed. Fourth, takeover 
attempts that have failed to provide sufficient data to fit our analysis have been 
removed. We have observed no systematic errors in the removed bid contests. 
Given the above criteria, the final dataset consists of 202 transactions. This 
could be argued as representative for the population of takeovers of publicly listed 
firms in Sweden. As presented earlier, to this sample only rumoured bids, bids 
with insufficient data and takeover bids where the initial bidder already controlled 
the target should be added to reach the full population. When speaking of 
takeovers in general terms, it also includes mergers and dependent on definition 
acquisitions of targets with private owners among other buyer- and contest-
specific characteristics. Transferability of the knowledge from this study onto 
these transactions could probably be valuable, however additional variables such 
as merger negotiations and in what different ways one could buy shares pre-bid 
have to be accounted for. We would expect the result to be transferable to public 
takeovers in other countries of similar shareholder structure. However, since 
regulatory environment is country specific to a large extent, this would have to be 
included in relation to the results to make conclusions on findings across 
countries.  
 
The final data set includes transactions that meet the following criteria: 
 
- Takeover bid announced between 01/01/1997-31/12/2012 and contest 
outcome known at 23/03/2013. 
- Targets listed on a Swedish stock exchange 
- Bidder with less than 50% control of target company 
- Bid on 100% of the remaining shares in the target company 
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7.3 Data processing 
From the before mentioned databases, the sample has been processed to disclose 
the desired contest characteristics, bid premiums and final outcome. With a time 
horizon of announcement day t, t-6 and t+18 months the dynamics in each 
individual transaction have been mapped. The following areas in 7.3.1 an onwards 
are worth to stress since they are adjustments made to address essential areas for 
the analysis. 
7.3.1 Toehold 
According to the definition presented in section 3.3, the toehold is the ownership 
of a stake in the target company pre-announcement (Betton & Eckbo, 2000; Ravid 
& Spiegel, 1999). By default, this is presented as a bidders portion of the target’s 
capital in the database Zephyr. Since this study is interested in the share of control 
synonymous with the share of the votes, this has to be corrected. Therefore, in 
those transactions where dual class shares are used, we have adjusted the toehold 
to account for the bidders share of the votes. Moreover, when premiums are 
calculated, this is done using the stronger voting power share’s base price given 
that both share classes are included as part of the offer. This could bring some 
deviations from what is presented in the offering documents as an offer is placed 
on all outstanding shares, where premium calculations could be adjusted to 
relative weights of both share classes.  
When information of size and existence of possible toeholds have been 
missing in the offering document and information has been unable to be sourced 
using other databases, the toehold has been classified as zero (Betton et al., 2009) 
Moreover, a distinction has been made between short term and long term 
toeholds, which is defined dependent on when the toehold position was acquired. 
In line with Betton et al. (2009), a toehold is categorised as long term if target 
shares were held prior to six month before the bid was announced. If all shares 
were acquired in the six months leading up to the bid, we define the toehold 
position as short term without the benefits of long-term interests into the 
company. 
The causality of variations in the toeholds and variations in the bid premium 
and probability of success should not be a concern for the validity of the results. 
Toeholds are per definition-acquired prior to announcement of offer. The opposite 
relationship of offer premiums leading to higher toeholds should not be an option. 
The conclusions should hence be based on a valid relationship (Bryman, 2003). 
7.3.2 Contest winner 
Each takeover contest has been addressed as successful or unsuccessful to the 
initial bidder. Whether a bid is considered successful or not is determined by the 
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offer’s announced final acceptance from tendering shareholders. If the number of 
shareholders accepts a bid to enable the bidder to reach an outcome with more 
than 50% of the votes, the takeover bid is considered to be successful. The 
concept of transaction success is hence not synonymous with completion of the 
offer. In many occasions the bidder include a conditional offer that oblige the 
bidder to complete the offer only if 70%, 90% or another eligible amount of the 
shareholder accept the offer. If this condition is not fulfilled, the bidder can 
choose to withdraw their offer. The transaction does hence not require shares to 
physically change hands to be considered successful. 
The above-mentioned treatment of success in transactions is in our view a 
correct way to determine the level of bid premium that would allow the bidder to 
obtain control of the company. An advantage with this view is that is does not 
discriminate among actors with different incentives and expressed conditions in a 
contest. A bidder with intent to buy any shares made available to him and a bidder 
who is only interested in buying if all shares are made available to him are treated 
equally. This adjustment is consistent with many existing studies that focuses on 
whether the bidder is able to purchase the target shares or not (De et al., 1996). 
7.3.3 Hostility 
A bid has been classified as hostile when the board of directors of the target 
company announced to their shareholder a recommendation not to accept the 
initial bid. Out of 202 takeovers in the complete dataset, 45 were categorised as 
hostile. The categorisation is a result of a process in which categorization from 
Zephyr and CapitalIQ have been manually controlled by public announcements 
during the event window.  
A few aspects have to be stressed in these transactions. In some transactions 
with a toehold bidder, an influential part of the board in the target company has 
contained representatives from the bidder company. In these contest, the 
independent board representatives’ recommendation has been used to determine 
the bid categorisation. Second, if the bidder has engaged in a bid jump after the 
initial bid and the board recommends the revised bid, the transaction is still 
considered hostile. As discussed earlier, the reaction to the first bid therefore sets 
the deal sub-type in a transaction. Third, only the board of directors’ 
announcements are judged to determine hostility in transactions. Public 
announcements made by large shareholders or the Swedish Shareholders 
Association (Sw: Aktiespararna) in relation to a bid is not used to determine 
hostility. This is consistent with the NBK’s recommendation, where the board of 
directors in the target company are obliged to present its view of the bid, and the 
reason for it, to the shareholders of the target company.
1
 (Nyström & Sjöman, 
2011).   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Found in NBK 2003, II.19. First addressed as a duty in 1999, action prior seen as appropriate of board of  
directors (Nyström & Sjöman, 2011). 
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7.4 Regression models 
We will in the below section of this chapter outline the different regression 
models we have constructed in order to test our hypotheses presented in chapter 6. 
7.4.1 Bid premium regression  
The first regression will test hypothesis 1, if there exists a negative relationship 
between the possession of a toehold and the bid premium. The regressions aims to 
identify the explanatory variables impact on the initial and final bid premium of 
the takeover attempt. To provide additional explanatory power to our model and 
to avoid spurious relationships, a number of control variables are introduced and 
presented below.  
As per Betton et al. (2009) the control premium is defined as the price offered 
at the announcement day, t, in relation to the unaffected share price 42 days prior 
to this date. This would hence reduce the impact of target price run-ups on the 
control premium, otherwise potentially included in the price at day of 
announcement. In our study, this imply (pini - p-42) / (p- 42). After adjusting for 
splits and dividends, pini is the initial offered price per share at t to current 
shareholders and p-42 is the share price 42 trading days prior to offer 
announcement.  
 
Initial Premiumt-42 = α0 + α1SZTOEHOLD +  α2HOSTILE + α3CASH + 
α4ln(TARGETSIZE) + α5BORIGIN + ε 
 
Final Premiumt-42 = α0 + α1SZTOEHOLD +  α2HOSTILE + α3CASH + 
α4ln(TARGETSIZE) + α5BORIGIN + α6MULTIBID + ε 
 
SZTOEHOLD: Scale variable of toehold size  
HOSTILE: Dummy variable with 1 if target response is hostile, 0 if not 
CASH
2
: Dummy variable with 1 if form of payment is cash only, 0 if other 
Ln (TARGETSIZE)
3
: Logarithmic scale variable of target market capitalisation 
BORIGIN
4
: Dummy variable with 1 if bidder origin is domestic, 0 if foreign 
MULTIBID
5
: Dummy variable with 1 if contest includes rival bidders or bid jumps, 0 if not 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2
 CASH (payment) variable used since (i) cash vs. stock decision as payment method signals the bidders true 
value to the market, and (ii) since cash opposed to stock is accompanied by an immediate tax burden that target 
shareholders requires compensation for. Cash bids would be expected to pay higher premiums (Stavlos, 1987). 
3
 Ln (TARGETSIZE) used since bidders are likely to pay a higher premium for small firms given (i) it is harder 
to conduct a correct valuation due to higher information asymmetries, (ii) since small firms have higher growth 
prospects and (iii) since bidder firms can afford to pay high for smaller bolt on acquisitions (Danbolt, 2004). 
4
 BORIGIN used since studies show foreign firms tend to pay higher premiums, partly based on thresholds to 
enter a new market is higher for a foreign firms relative domestic (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). 
5
 MULTIBID used since bids in excess of initial bid inflates the total consideration per share in a contest. 
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7.4.2 Robustness of premium regression 
To test the robustness of our results, the premium regression will be run with an 
additional definition of initial and final premium commonly used among 
practitioners as evident in the offering documents. This takes the offer price in 
relation to the closing price at last day of trading before an announcement has 
been made, at t-1. The price at last trading day could include price run-ups and 
therefore result in deviations among transactions. It is therefore not frequently 
used among academic researchers on the subject. However, running these tests 
with the last trading day as the base share price component will also allow our 
results to be used to include this aspect as well as allow for a wider interpretation 
among practitioners in addition to academic purposes. 
7.4.3 Probability of success regression 
The second regression aims to clarify how the probability of success in a takeover 
contest is dependent on a set of independent variables. Consistent with Walkling 
(1985), Walkling & Long (1984) and Jennings & Mazeo (1993) we will use a 
binomial logistic regression model to estimate this probability. The dependent 
variable, probability of success, in the model can take on a value between a win 
(1) and a no win (0) for the initial bidder. The resulting measure will hence 
express the probability for the initiating bidder to win the contest. 
 
Pr. of success =  α0 + α1SZTOEHOLD + α2CASH + α3MULTIBID + α4 
FPREMIUMt-42 + α5ln(TARGETSIZE) + α6HOSTILE ε 
 
SZTOEHOLD: Scale variable of toehold size  
CASH: Dummy variable with 1 if form of payment is cash only, 0 if other 
MULTIBID: Dummy variable with 1 if contest includes rival bidders or bid jumps, 0 if else 
FPREMIUMt-42: Initial bidders final offer price in relation to unaffected share price at t-42 
Ln (TARGETSIZE): Logarithmic scale variable of target market capitalisation 
HOSTILE: Dummy variable with 1 if target response is hostile, 0 if not 
7.4.4 Robustness of probability of success regression 
The robustness of the results when running the regression on the full sample will 
be challenged by a second run performed on the subsample of 45 hostile 
takeovers. This is done since previous research indicate that any relationships 
could be hard to prove for a full sample given an overall high success rate and that 
it has been a higher frequency of toehold bidders in hostile takeovers. (Walkling, 
1985 and Betton et al., 2009). 
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8 Empirical findings 
Chapter 8 contains a description of the dataset. We will present general patterns of 
bid contest characteristics and outcome across the sample in section 8.1. In section 
8.2, we will use the outcome of the quantitative methods used to statistically 
challenge the hypotheses on bid premiums and success in the observed contests. 
8.1 Description of dataset 
Out of the 202 contests, a winner was acknowledged in 181 of which the initial 
bidder won in 171 and a rival bidder in 10. The remaining 21 takeover attempts 
ended without a winner, primarily because of an insufficient target acceptance 
rate. An initial bidder that announced an offer would then have won in 84.5% of 
all attempts. When a bid was received at the targets board of directors, a majority 
of the contest were recommended onto its shareholders (78%). Still, 
approximately one in five initial bids (22%) was turned down by the target board 
of directors and categorized as hostile. The average price of the target shares was 
29.8% above the unaffected share price in the initial bid. Since a high number of 
contests (93%) did not lead to an increased offer or a rival bidder entering the 
contest, the average final premium was only a bit higher at 31.8%. Based on the 
Table 2  
Table presents the complete dataset of 202 takeover contests. The top panel of data contain figures in absolute numbers. 
The bottom panel presents the corresponding proportional values. Target value is expressed as firms Market Value at t-42 
in millions of SEK. Variables are further defined in chapter 7, section 3.  
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data, one can state that a main driver behind a failed takeover bid was a hostile 
response, which reduced the initial bidders chance of winning to 51.1%. In the 
situation that a rival bidder entered a contest, friendly or hostile, not only would 
the initial bidder have to pay a higher premium, 40.1% compared to 31.9%, only 
one in five bid attempts led to a successful outcome. The two negative aspects of 
hostility and rival bidders combined meant terrible news for the initial bidder. 
When observed in the same contest, it led to an unsuccessful outcome for the 
initial bidder in all of the seven attempts during the analysed period. We will now 
look at the different aspects of the takeover contests in more detail. 
When separating our data into hostile and friendly takeover contests, out of all 
contests, 78% were friendly while the remaining 22% faced resistance by the 
target board. Columns 2 and 3 in table 2 indicate that hostile transactions were 
more common in large target companies with an average size 56.7% higher than 
for friendly targets, 3,300MSEK compared to 2,105MSEK. Consistent with the 
overall sample there is some skewness to these results indicated by a median 
value of 493MSEK for hostile contests, which is marginally higher than for the 
complete sample. These findings are consistent with the results obtained by 
Betton et al. (2009) in their paper on US targets of less large targets in public 
takeover attempts.  
The percentage of friendly contests where the initial bidder won was high, 
amounting to 94.3%. In contrast, the success ratio of hostile bids was modest with 
a successful outcome for the initial bidder in only 51.1% of all contests. When 
comparing these figures to the findings of Betton et al. (2009) for US firms, their 
findings are lower, amounting to 68% and 34.4% respectively. This suggests that 
the probability for a successful bid contest for an initial bidder is higher in 
Sweden compared to US, independent of whether contest is friendly or hostile.  
Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of hostile and friendly public takeover attempts in Sweden. 
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The separation of subtypes also allows us to observe deviations in premium 
levels. Accordingly, the initial bid premium for hostile takeover attempts was 
21.2% compared to 32.5% for friendly contests, a substantial difference of 11.3%. 
One could argue that a low initial premium would cause a hostile response and 
that the observed lower premiums for hostile takeovers therefore would be self-
fulfilling. The result is however unchanged when we test the result with two 
counter-arguments. First, when we account for the higher frequency of multiple 
bids in hostile takeovers one could say that this would be upwards adjusted in the 
final premium. Though, when comparing the difference in final bid premiums the 
result is unchanged, with 25.2% compared to 33.9% respectively. Second, since 
more hostile contests are unsuccessful compared to friendly, could that be an 
explanation to the observed lower premiums for hostile bid contests? If 
controlling for this argument and only comparing successful bid contests, the 
average final bid premium was still lower for hostile contests of 23.2% compared 
33.94% for friendly. The results for the analysed sample therefore strongly 
suggest that premiums are lower in hostile competitions compared to friendly. The 
results contradict the results found by Betton et al. (2009) for US targets. While 
their findings indicate that the initial (final) bid premiums for hostile targets are 
5% (15%) above friendly targets, the result for Sweden indicates the reverse 
relationship. Walkling and Long (1984) however found a similar but insignificant 
result as ours based on US competitions.  
Among all transactions, cash has been the most frequent method of payment 
used in 75% of all contests. Initial bidders who made cash offers were successful 
in 89.5% of the competitions while bidders who used stock or mixed payments 
only succeeded in 70% of the cases. A possible explanation for this is the 
difference in initial (final) bid premiums present between cash of 30.3% (32.3%) 
Fig. 2 Frequency distribution of method of payment in public takeover attempts in Sweden. 
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and other payment methods of 28.3% (30.4%). This is consistent with the 
predictions of Stavlos (1987) based on the immediate tax burden on cash 
payments that target shareholders require compensation for. A viable reason for 
the result could also be the potential bidder share price overvaluation that is 
signalled through the usage of stock as payment. Given that the premiums are of 
equal size in cash and stock offers, target shareholders devaluate the bid premium 
when stock is used and hence could reject a higher proportion of the stock bids 
due to an expected share price decline.  
As for the competitive climate, by dividing our data sample into single and 
rival bidder contests a number of interesting findings emerge. By observing the 
complete contest sample, only 7.5% of the takeover bids have attracted rival 
bidders. The data shows that rival bidders occurred in 15.6% of the contests when 
the initial bid was met with a hostile response, while the proportion were only 
5.1% in friendly attempts. This suggests that a rival bidder’s entrance in the 
contest is attributable to initial target hostility. The initial bids that induce rival 
bids seem to have a lower median premium than the comparable for single bidder 
contests. As previously mentioned, this low premium is also the main driver for 
the hostility categorisation, suggesting the reason behind rival bidders entering a 
contest being simultaneously driven of low initial bids and target hostility.  
By examining the competition aspect of a bid contest, we see that the 
implications of a rival bidder entering the process are considerable. The final bid 
premium in a rival contest has an average of 40.1% compared to 31.2% in single 
bidder contests. Despite the high final bid premium offered by the initial bidder, a 
rival bidder entering the contest largely reduces the probability of success. While 
a bidder in a single bid contest wins in 89.8% of the contests, the initial bidder in 
a rival process only obtains a successful outcome in 20% despite the high final bid 
premium of 40.1%. The no winner outcome increases marginally from 10% to 
Fig. 3 Comparison of the winner in public takeovers among contests with a single bidder and 
contests with rival bidders. The premium definition used refers to the final offer in relation to 
the share price 42 days prior to announcement. 
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13% of the contests, so the winner distribution changes to a majority of rival 
bidders at the expense of initial bidders. 
We add the toehold variable into the table in order to illustrate its impact on 
our results. We see toeholds in 37.6% of our contests for the full sample, which 
substantially exceeds Betton et al. (2009) frequency of 12.6%. Consistent with 
their results, the toehold frequency in hostile takeovers is much higher than in 
friendly contests. Our sample witness of toeholds in 67% (29%) of the hostile 
(friendly) contests in our sample compared to the 50% (11%) frequency as seen in 
Betton et al. (2009). There is some skewness to the friendly toeholds, where the 
average size is 8.7% and the median is zero. When looking at the hostile toeholds, 
this skewness completely disappears and we see an average of 20.4% and a 
Fig 5. Presentation of the historical frequency distribution of toehold size measured in 5%-
intervals. A toehold is considered long if some or all shares were held six months before bid was 
announced. In contrast, if all shares were acquired in the six months leading up to the bid, it is 
considered short term (Betton et al., 2009) . 
 
Fig. 4 Frequency distribution of toeholds in friendly and hostile takeovers. 
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median of 20.1%, suggesting an even distribution of toehold size in the hostile 
sample.  
When only focusing on the bids where the initial bidder owned a toehold, we 
see that this was the case in 37.6% of the contests. As visible in figure 5, a 
majority of the toeholds were of large size. In more detail, 59.2% of the toehold 
owners controlled more than 30% of the votes in the target firm before the bid 
was announced. With only a few exceptions, these had been held more than six 
month before the takeover announcement date. When observing the toeholds of 
less than 30%, the distribution among long and short-term possessions is more 
evenly allocated. We have in this study argued that the Swedish market is 
characterised by large controlling blockholders. These results seem to support this 
condition. Accordingly, this indicates that the Swedish market for corporate 
control has encouraged long-term blockholders and discouraged bidders from 
building toeholds on a short-term basis due to strict disclosure rules. 
 
 
When relating our dataset to the hypotheses we can point out a number of 
important findings. First, the differences in the bid premiums in toehold contests 
and the no-toehold contests suggest that it could be a relationship in support of 
hypothesis 1. The relationship between toehold size and bid premium could be 
expected to be negative, with smaller premiums for larger toehold size. The 
premium difference between toehold and no-toehold contests visible in column 16 
and 17 of Table 2, witness of 11.4% lower initial bid premiums and 10.3% lower 
final bid premiums. This result suggest support for the theoretical results of 
Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Eckbo & Langohr (1989), Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), 
Fig. 6. The first axis presents a frequency distribution of successful and unsuccessful takeover 
attempts across the full sample. The second axis presents the average final premium, t.42, over time. 
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Betton & Eckbo (2000) as well as Goldman & Qian (2005). These findings also 
supports the empirical results by Asquith & Kieschnick (1999) and Betton Eckbo 
(2000), but fails to support the positive relationship suggested by Chowdry & 
Jegadeesh (1994) and Burkart (1995).  
By observing the success rate it is clear that initial hostility has a major 
implication on the outcome probabilities. In our dataset, the percentage of positive 
outcomes is reduced from 94.3% to 51.1% when we move from friendly to hostile 
target response. Conditional on the bid turning hostile the aspect of rival bidders 
becomes even more important. If a rival bidder enters the contest, the percentage 
of positive outcomes drops sharply. Out of our hostile contest with rival bidders 
there is not a single occasion were the initial bidder won the competition, resulting 
in 0% positive outcomes. If the process was friendly and a rival bidder entered, 
the rival bidder’s impact was still large with a 72.9% drop from 94.3% positive 
outcomes to a new success rate of 21.4%. Hence it seems vital to deter 
competitors from entering a contest, independent of whether the initial bid 
received a hostile target response or not.  
In the theoretic chapter of this thesis, chapter 5, we have argued that a toehold 
position has a deterring effect on rival bidders entry in a competition. More 
importantly, when looking at the situation between toehold owners initiating a 
hostile bid contest and presence of rival bidders, we see that rival bidders only 
entered in 1 out of 30 (3.33%) of these contests. This was well below the no-
toehold contests where rival bidders entered in 7.9%, adding support to the 
deterrence effect of toeholds suggested by Eckbo & Langohr (1989) and Betton & 
Eckbo (2000).  Interestingly, consistent with the results of Betton & Eckbo (2000) 
we see that in 12 of 15 rival bid cases a rival bidder entered the contest with 
equally or better toehold state and size as of the initial bidder. This would provide 
additional proof of the benefits and the deterrence effect that follows with a 
toehold ownership, requiring a rival bidder to even out the playing field before 
entering the contest. 
  
  37 
8.2 Regression results 
In the previous section a number of clear tendencies became visible that allowed 
some preliminary conclusions to be drawn of toeholds relationship to premium 
and success. This section intends to test the tendencies visible in 8.1 and hence 
conclude if the hypotheses can be determined statistically significant or not. 
8.2.1 Bid premium 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the initial and final premium that is 
conducted in order to examine hypothesis 1. Consistent with the primary 
definition used in our thesis we examine the relationship between the toehold size 
and the initial and final premium for the unaffected share price, t-42. To test the 
robustness of our model as covered in section 7.4.2, we add the bid premium 
definition of t-1. The discussion below will mainly be focused on the definition of 
the bid premium t-42, while some reasoning regarding the results caused by the 
different definitions will be conducted when applicable.  
To begin, the goodness of fit for our model according to R2-value is between 
10.2% and 11.7%. This could intuitively be argued as a low value. However, 
Table 3 
Table includes a presentation of the regression results of the determinants of the bid premium. t refers to the 
day of announcement. Premiums are calculated using offer price in relation to the share price at 1 and 42 
days prior to this date dependent on definition. Hostility, cash payment, bidder origin and multiple bids in 
contest are dummy variables. Size of toehold and natural logarithm of target size are scale variables. All 
variables are further presented in chapter 7. 
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considering the fact that this study focus on a specific aspect of the takeover 
situation the result is rather expected. For example, the regression model used to 
determine this relationship disregards fundamentals like bidder synergies 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009), economic value aspects (Varaiya, 1987), management 
hubris and free cash flow problems (Jensen, 1988; Lang & Walkling, 1991; Roll, 
1986) and target financials that all are common determinants of the bid premium. 
When benchmarking the R2-value to Betton & Eckbo (2000) whom use a similar 
regression model to test the same dependent variable, our result of 10.2% for 
initial premiums is well above their 5.8%. It could therefore be argued that the fit 
of our model is rather good given the narrow scope of our analysis. 
The constant in our regression shows a premium intercept of 27.3% for the 
initial premium and 33.8% for the final. This is close to the average premiums 
from the complete sample presented in 8.1 and indicates that the model provides a 
good and intuitive platform to commence our analysis.  
Consistent with our prediction in hypothesis 1 the toehold size variable has a 
negative coefficient for the initial (final) premium of -0.288 (-0.281). The 
negative relationship between toehold size and bid premiums are highly 
significant, indifferent of the premium definition used. The given coefficients 
translate into a relationship where the larger the toehold size, the lower premium. 
By expressing this result as a marginal effect, a 1% increase in toehold size 
reduces the premium level with 0.288% of the initial bid premium and 0.281% of 
the final. These results provide significant evidence to the theoretical predictions 
of hypotheses 1. 
When analysing the remaining variables, hostility, cash, target size, bidder 
origin and multiple bids, significant results are only detectable in one, namely the 
target size. In section 8.1, emphasis was put on payment methods and its impact 
on bid premiums. The dataset allowed us to see that cash payment resulted in 
higher premiums than other methods. However, the regression fails to provide any 
statistical significance to our results.  
While one intuitively could expect hostility to show a negative relationship to 
the bid premium by observing Table 2, with premium levels substantially lower 
for hostile contests, the analysis of our dataset fails to find any statistical 
significance for this argument.  
As said, the target size is a significant determinant for the bid premium, but 
not for all definitions. The variable hence fails to provide any significant results 
when looking at the t-42 definition of the premium. However, it is highly 
significant for the t-1 definition. This is a puzzling result, but it seems that larger 
targets reduces the premium when we look at t-1. In the limitations of toeholds 
section in this thesis we presented arguments for price run-ups in target share 
price. A central aspect in these arguments was that the larger the firm size, the 
more brokers covered the company and the more public attention was drawn 
towards the firm. Our result could indicate that the price run up is more impactful 
for larger firms, and the bid premium is hence reduced to a higher degree for 
larger firms when comparing the share price at the last day of trading prior to the 
announcement. This result is consistent with the prediction of Asquith & 
Kieschnick (1999) who argues that toeholds should be smaller the larger the firm, 
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given the higher market awareness and the associated complications to build 
toeholds. Our result would support their notion that the price run up is higher for 
larger firms, which causes the base price for the bid premium to be inflated. With 
a higher unaffected share price used to calculate the premium, the premium level 
seems lower for larger firms than for smaller firms.  
The variable multibid includes contests with rival bidders and revisions of 
initial bidder’s offer. It is therefore by definition excluded from the initial 
premium regression. The relationship between this variable and the final premium 
was proven to be highly significant. Consequently, we see from the result that 
when multiple bids occurred in the contests, the final premium increased with 
14.4% at the unaffected share price and 13.3% compared to the last day of 
trading.   
8.2.2 Probability of success 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the logit regression model on the estimated 
probability of success in the bid contests. As seen in column 2 and 5, the results 
are rather inconclusive of a toeholds determinacy in the full sample but 
significantly improved for the hostile sub-sample. For the full sample, hostility 
and competition in a bid contest decreases the probability of success as expected. 
The effect on the initial bidders worsened outlooks in the contest is significant at a 
1% level. Hostility is a commonly used explanation against the initial bidders 
success. 
It seems that cash as a payment method is a significant predictor of success. 
The hard currency aspect of cash relative to stock payment, as discussed in 8.1, 
Table 4 
A presentation is given of the logit regression model used to define the determinants of the probability of 
success in public takeover contests. The regression model is used on the full (202) and hostile (45) samples 
separately. Size of toehold, final premium and the natural logarithm of target size are scale variables. Cash 
payment, multiple bids in a contest and hostility are dummy variables. All variables are further presented 
in chapter 7 
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increases the probability of a positive outcome by its value robustness for target 
shareholders. This is an expected result given the previous discussion and the 
available literature on the subject (Stavlos, 1987). In contrast to the significant 
result of cash payment, the premium level and target size do not seem to 
determine the final outcome in a bid contest for the full sample. For a large 
sample of 202 contests of all sizes and firm fundamentals, these do not 
independently seem to be a determinant of the success in a takeover contest. 
The fit of the model for the full sample is a medium satisfactory 42%. This 
could be attributed to the large amount of contests that were successful. A similar 
disturbance to the result was found in Walkling (1985) who neither managed to 
conclude on toehold relationships when hostile and friendly contests were studied 
combined. A study with separated samples therefore had to be done. To our study, 
we find two reasons for the insignificant effects in the regressions. First, the high 
frequency of success across the full sample (84.5%) in combination with the 
relatively low frequency of toeholds (37.6%) could be insufficient for 
relationships to become evident. Second the frequency of unsuccessful contests is 
higher in hostile takeovers in addition to a higher frequency of toeholds. The 
observed negative coefficient of toeholds for the full sample could be understood 
in this way and is therefore in a way slightly misleading. Subsequently, we cannot 
find evidence for hypothesis 2 by studying the full sample. In order to avoid this 
disruption, we attempt to run the logit regression model on the subsample of 
hostile takeovers as presented in the robustness of the regression model in section 
7.4.4. Differences could be expected as this includes a more dispersed distribution 
of toeholds and success across the sample. In addition, bids in the sub-sample 
hostile contests have all been rejected by the target board, which has previously 
been stated as the most significant determinant of success in a takeover. In that 
sense, it does not discriminate between contests recommended vis-à-vis not 
recommended by the target board of directors.  
Among the transactions that have been rejected by the board, the model 
manages to provide a better explanation of the relationships, with an R2-value of 
57.9%.  Now, we can see a significant effect of toeholds and the size of the 
company on the probability of success. Among the hostile contests, a revised bid 
from the initial bidder or a rival bid being placed does not seem to affect the 
probability of success in the model. Neither does the choice of payment method. 
Interestingly, the final premium fails to determine the success outcome in the 
contest. To us, this implies that firm characteristics or other fundamentals drives 
the premium level and should hence not be included in a discussion were the level 
of the bid premium is directly related to the probability of success. In essence, 
something other has been of more significance to our model in the observed 
takeovers, namely the possession of toeholds among the bidders.  
To begin, the size of the toehold is significant in the way it determines the 
contest outcome. A larger toehold increases the probability of success for the 
initial bidder. This is consistent with hypothesis 2 and previous findings of 
(Betton & Eckbo, 2000; Hirshleifer & Titman, 1990; Jennings & Mazeo, 1993 
and Walkling, 1985) 
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Figure 7 (A) shows that a bidder with no toehold in a hostile takeover has a 
probability to win of 12%. A toehold at the first level of disclosure (5%) increases 
that probability to 19%. It is estimated more likely to succeed than loose at a 
toehold level of 18%. For toeholds that triggers the mandatory bid principle in 
Sweden at 30%, these have an estimated probability to win of at least 78%.  
Intuitively, this means that all toeholds increase a bidders probability to win. If a 
bidder could acquire a large block of shares in a company, it would most likely 
lead to a successful takeover and subsequently the control of the company.  
 
 
 
If we return to Table 4, not only the toehold mattered in the studied contests, 
the other significant determinant was the market value of the target company. By 
studying the hostile sample, target companies with smaller market values at t-42 
were more likely to lead to an unsuccessful outcome.  
In figure 7 (B), the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 quartile of target companies are included. The 
first conclusion that could be made is that the relationship of toehold size on the 
increased probability of success is valid indifferent of the target firm’s size. 
Second, the result indicates that it has been harder to push through a takeover of a 
smaller firm. While this suggest additional analysis on the significance of toeholds 
in relation to target firm’s size, we are satisfied to conclude that the relationships 
are valid indifferent of target firm size. We are therefore in a position where the 
results of the regression models could be summarized, discussed and 
problematized in a wider scope related to the Swedish market for public 
takeovers. Accordingly, this is being done in chapter 9. 
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Fig. 7. A) Estimated probability of success among hostile takeovers. Assumptions based on median values from 
Table 2. Example based on cash payment, bid premium of 31.8%, target market value 424MSEK and a single 
bidder contest. B) Estimated probability of success among hostile takeovers of different sizes. Assumptions based 
on median values from Table 2. Example uses cash payment, bid premium of 31.8%, target market value of 1st – 
3rd quartile (162; 424; 2046msek) and a single bidder contest. 
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Summary and discussion 
The focus of this thesis has been to analyse a bidder’s initial ownership in the 
target firm, the toehold, and its ability to determine the bid premium and 
probability to succeed in a Swedish public takeover contest. The study is based on 
theories related to toeholds that currently seem unable to provide the reader with 
an aligned view of the toeholds impact on the contest characteristics and its 
outcome. Given the Swedish (i) disclosure rules and the (ii) shareholder structure 
that clearly deviates from the US conditions, we identified conditions that 
possibly could impact the applicability of the inconclusive theories. The purpose 
of this thesis was to clarify the toeholds impact on bid premiums and the expected 
bid success in Swedish public takeovers. The dataset collected for this thesis 
consists of a total of 202 bid contests spanning from 1997 to 2012. 
Given the current state of knowledge of the toehold relationships we 
formulated two hypotheses, both covering two separated but interrelated areas of 
importance in the toehold field. First, we expected the bid premiums to decrease 
as the size of the toehold increased. Second, we expected that the larger the 
toehold size owned by the initial bidder, the higher probability to win the bid 
contest. Our hypotheses are based on the expectation that, with the regulatory 
framework in place and the shareholder structure that characterise the Swedish 
market, toeholds should be of larger size when present compared to previous 
findings in US samples.  
When analysing hypothesis 1, we found strong evidence for its negative 
relationship to the bid premium. Already when separating contests into toehold 
bidders and non-toehold bidders, the result witnessed of a possible relationship 
between the groups where the average initial (final) premium was 11.4% (10.3%) 
lower for toehold bidders. This strongly suggested that a relationship could be 
proven. When then examining the full dataset using an OLS regression model, a 
significant negative relationship could be seen. As suggested by our hypothesis, 
the toehold coefficient turned out to be highly significant as a determinant of the 
bid premium across all contests. This was clear evidence to hypothesis 1 and 
consistent with the relationship predicted by Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Betton & 
Eckbo (2000) and Goldman & Qian (2005) among others, while concurrently not 
in support of the positive relationships suggested by Chowdry & Jegadeesh (1994) 
and Burkart (1995). 
Hypothesis 2 could partially be supported by our test. When using a logit 
regression model to determine the probability of success for the initial bidder, the 
full sample did not provide any significant results of a relationship between the 
  43 
two variables. However, since the occurrence of toeholds and failed takeover 
attempts has been unevenly distributed, with higher frequencies of both variables 
in hostile takeovers, this result was rather expected. This has also been an issue 
for previous researchers (Walkling, 1985). It was therefore reasonable to expect 
more valid results by analysing the hostile sample separately, where contest 
success was not disturbed by an overall high success rate. Consequently, when 
analysing the hostile sample, the relationship between toehold size and probability 
to win proved to be highly significant. The results confirmed our expectation that 
the toehold size has a positive relationship with a successful contest outcome. 
Therefore, if the bidder anticipated or experienced resistance from the target board 
of directors, a toehold seemed to be useful to push the bid through consistent with 
Betton et al. (2009). The results of hypothesis 2 hence support the predictions of 
Hirshleifer & Titman (1990) that contest success is increasing with the size of the 
toehold, independent of the bid premium level. This is also consistent with the 
empirical results of Walkling (1985), Jennings & Mazeo (1993) and Betton & 
Eckbo (2000). Our results however failed to support Chowdry & Jegadeesh 
(1994) prediction that the toehold leads to a higher probability of success, but only 
through the higher bid premium. This theory fails to find support in our result 
partly through the lack of significance for the bid premiums impact on the 
outcome, but also as toeholds bid premium relationship was negative as proven in 
hypothesis 1.  
Consequently, what conclusions can be made from the results of hypothesis 1 
and 2 compared to what is already known? To begin, by including a chapter of the 
regulatory deviations across countries, we presented arguments for why one 
cannot take the results obtained from previous research on the US market for 
granted when examining the situation in Sweden. We argue that one cannot fully 
understand the conditions on the market for public takeovers by only analysing 
differences in the shareholder structure. In order to explain toeholds presence and 
their importance in a bid contest, one also has to consider the regulatory 
conditions impacting, in our thesis focusing on how a toehold can be acquired or 
disposed. Since the regulations on takeovers and share acquisitions differ across 
the countries, the regulations would most likely affect the results. In addition, 
Sweden has a high vote to capital ratio compared to other countries, with 
regulations and market conditions that have facilitated the large shareholders. 
These conditions are, seen by us, arguably the most important reason for the large 
toeholds, seen on the Swedish market, consistent with our expectation. Moreover, 
the findings hence highlight that relationships found on a sample of US takeovers 
by (Betton et al., 2009) are valid for a market with a more concentrated 
shareholder structure and stricter disclosure rules.  
Now, if we consider the findings in hypotheses 1 and 2 to be true, they 
indicate that toehold bidders can acquire firms cheaper, but still have a higher 
expected probability to succeed. How could it be possible that toehold bidders win 
more competitions but pay less in Swedish takeovers? One explanation for the 
high probability to win is the deterring effect on potential entry of rival bidders in 
a competition, as argued by Betton & Eckbo (2000), Hirshleifer & Titman (1990), 
Jennings & Mazeo (1993) and Walkling (1985). A rival bidder is aware of the 
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toehold bidders incentives for aggressive bidding behaviour and his behaviour to 
gain in the contest from the already owned shares in the target. Conditional on the 
rival bidder not possessing a toehold, he lacks the benefits that the toehold owner 
can utilize. We can based on above argue that there is less competition in a contest 
with a toehold bidder due to the deterrence effect. This argument is consistent 
with Stultz et al. (1990) and supported by our finding that less toehold bidders 
were challenged with rival bids. In addition, in the contests where a rival bidder 
entered the contest, they usually entered with an equal or better toehold state and 
size as of the initial bidder. This was evident in 12 of 15 rival bids in our sample, 
consistent with the findings in Betton & Eckbo (2000).  
The uneven playing field caused by toeholds could hence be an explanation 
and this thesis provides tentative support for the argument. However more 
importantly, as discussed in the method chapter one should be aware of that a 
public takeover is a complex process with a significant amount of undisclosed 
information and discussions between actor without the public’s awareness. We 
could expect, yet not conclude, that deterring effect in takeover contest could be 
even bigger than what is possible to provide evidence for in this thesis.  
If we then accept that the relationships hold, how would market actors comply 
with it given that the Swedish shareholder structure is more focused than the US, 
with toeholds both higher in frequency and larger in size? It could be argued that 
the focused shareholder structure seen in Sweden cause impacts to amplify even 
further. With larger deviations in strategic abilities between toehold and non-
toehold owners, a higher level of awareness among academics, practitioners and 
regulators is required. We hence believe that the evolved Swedish shareholder 
structure and regulations for takeovers and share acquisitions, to some extent, face 
a risk of creating frictions by discriminating among the market actors ability to 
compete in a takeover contest.  It could be argued that the relationships and high 
frequency of large controlling blockholders hence disallows the market to fully 
function without inefficiencies.  
Potential inefficiencies could be illustrated by two examples. In the first, we 
consider a situation when a large shareholder initiates a takeover contest and a 
rival bidder evaluates if to enter the competition or not. The first bidder’s toehold 
position would work as a deterring tool against the rival bidder’s entrance, which 
accordingly could refuse to enter the competition “naked” as he is aware of the 
competitive advantage of the toehold owner. The rival bidder would be forced to 
position him with an evenly large toehold position if he is determined to enter the 
contest, as reported by Stultz et al. (1990) and Betton & Eckbo (2000). However, 
it is hard for a rival bidder to match the toehold position held by a large owner by 
acquiring shares in the market as a short-term strategy. Even if he manages to 
acquire a desired block, it would most likely not be purchased to an unaffected 
price due to the run-up costs caused by the high level of transparency of holdings 
in Sweden. This reasoning will leave the large shareholder uncontested for the 
target, resulting in less bidders and target shareholders’ loosing out on a potential 
value maximization that a rival bidder would cause.  
Second, inefficiencies are also evident in a situation when a bidder with no 
toehold in the target consider bidding on a target, where the observed shareholder 
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contain one or several large shareholders. By applying the findings of Betton & 
Eckbo (2000), and possibly anticipate competition from existing shareholders, this 
initial bidder would want to enter the bid contest with an equally large toehold as 
the large shareholder. If the bidder enters the contest naked and the large 
shareholder decides to challenge as a rival bidder, our results shows that it is 
highly likely that the large shareholder with a strong toehold position would win. 
If bidding at all, a strategy of bidding with a toehold would hence be preferable. 
As we have argued, the Swedish disclosure rules and the associated run up costs 
prohibit the bidder to build a toehold unnoticed. Given the relationships found in 
Sweden, we hence suspect that situations occur where large shareholders 
systematically will benefit from their competitive advantage causing less 
takeovers and an inactive takeover market for firms of this type.  
Conclusively, this thesis has shown evidence that toehold bidders has a 
substantial benefit when initiating a public takeover contest. The toehold bidder 
pays on average a lower premium in the takeover and could be expected to win 
more often. We have shown that the relationship is no different on the Swedish 
market for public takeovers compared to prior research on a US sample. The 
results therefore suggest that the abilities enabled through toeholds cause 
inefficiencies on the market Swedish for corporate control, making it an area 
suitable for further research.   
9.2 Suggestion for future research 
On the basis of the above-mentioned results, we find this subject to be of high 
interest to evaluate further. A couple of aspects has been identified that could be 
of interest to research more deeply. If beginning where our previous discussion 
ended, the current Swedish condition for takeovers is something we identified as 
ineffective in regards to toeholds impact on the competitive environment in a 
takeover situation. However, no attempts are made in this thesis to analyse 
potential amendments of the Swedish takeover regulations or other measures that 
could reduce the competitive advantage currently in possession of large 
shareholders. We are humble to the possibility that there might be certain aspects 
regarding the takeover situation that we have not considered, or other benefits that 
follows with the transparency in the current structure.  
A study examining the consequences of different takeover regulations and 
shareholder structures could be of great interest. For example, the US regulation 
has been criticized for being poorly updated and unsuitable for a time period with 
the current rapid information flows. A suggestion could be to research the 
potential consequences of an updated set of regulations, with stricter disclosure 
rules, and how the introduction could impact the US takeover market. Moreover, 
by contrasting Sweden to markets with diverging takeover regulations, not 
necessarily US or UK, one could enhance the understanding of the area. Perhaps 
there is an optimal shareholder structure and takeover regulations that both protect 
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current owners from “corporate raiders”, yet facilitates an active takeover market 
with emphasize on value maximization? Further research in this area is desirable. 
If relating possible further research to the practical limitations that we have 
experienced in this thesis, we identify several areas to add knowledge. A central 
aspect in the argumentation throughout the thesis has been the price run-up costs 
that occur pre-bid and the consequences that accompany short-term toehold 
purchases. In the bid premium regression we indicated possible run-ups for large 
targets, were a substantial difference was observed for the bid premiums when 
comparing the values from different definitions. Our thesis would have been even 
more thorough and robust if we would have been able to investigate the target 
market movements before a bid announcement, and more closely examine the 
market rumours including their impact on the share price. By adding variables on 
target price run-ups and possible bid mark-ups for each contest, more of the 
dynamics of the takeover situation could have been mapped. An examination of 
the six months prior to bid announcement in relation to the toehold variables 
impact on contest outcomes could be an interesting area to research further.  
We have used quantitative methods in this thesis where the focus has been on 
hard information available in databases. Two areas regarding more soft values 
could be of interest to investigate. First, we noticed occasions where the toehold 
owner announced a bid on the target, while controlling a number of the seats in 
the board of directors. This complicates the boards procedure with their decision 
making regarding whether to recommend the bid or not, as a large fraction of the 
board is biased. Moreover, it could be assumed that aggressive takeover defences 
rarely are activated when the bidder to a large extent owns the target. Target board 
composition could hence be an important aspect that possibly impacts the 
outcomes more than we could observe. This could very likely be a central 
determinant for the probability of success when a toehold bidder initiates a 
takeover contest. Second, we have argued that large blockholders presence in a 
firm could have a deterring effect for bidders lacking toehold positions. An 
examination of the frequency of blockholders in a target and the associated 
characteristic of the takeover contest could provide valuable information. This is 
especially interesting in takeover contest where the bid is submitted conditional 
on a 90% acceptance rate.  As an example, are we more likely to see takeover 
attempts on targets with dispersed ownership with many small owners, or with a 
low number of shareholders with corner positions that could block the takeover? 
Differently put, to what extent is the targets shareholder structure a determinant of 
takeover activity? 
To conclude, we would like to analyse the bidding behaviour of toehold 
bidders in more detail. This is particularly related to its bidding strategy. With the 
finding in 8.1 of lower final bid premiums in hostile compared to friendly 
takeovers in mind, could it be that toehold bidders skim the target with a low price 
to take advantage of their bargaining power that the toehold brings? We would 
hence like to find out more of bidders individual decision-making models that 
accounts for both valuation metrics and contest characteristics. We therefore see 
several areas of interest to explore in this subject and we expect much more to be 
discovered on these puzzling relationships in the future.   
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10 Appendix 
10.1 Correlation matrix of regression variables 
 
10.2 List of Swedish public takeovers, 1997-2012 
 
  
BORIGIN HOSTILE CASH TOESIZE RIVAL SUCCESS MULTIBID TARG.SZ FP42
BORIGIN - - - - - - - - -
HOSTILE 0.119 - - - - - - - -
CASH -0.082 -0.051 - - - - - - -
TOESIZE 0.175 0.284 0.216 - - - - - -
RIVAL 0.077 0.166 -0.144 -0.064 - - - - -
SUCCESS -0.158 -0.485 0.222 -0.057 -0.498 - - - -
MULTIBID 0.012 0.352 -0.071 0.037 0.619 -0.41 - - -
TARG.SZ -0.214 0.072 0.076 -0.132 0.122 -0.022 0.23 - -
FP42 -0.179 -0.139 0.03 -0.221 0.087 0.048 0.146 0.109 -
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